Future and Challenges of LGBT in Eastern Europe: The Rise of Populism and Political Movement Analysis in Poland

Aswin A. Azis and Alifia N. Azarine

ABSTRACT

Poland becomes one of the states located in East Europe that is recognized as one of the Soviet Union's "former" alliances. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Poland began to show its openness to become part of the European Union as a supranational organization that regulates various policies at the national level for its members. However, regulations regarding guarantees for upholding human rights for every individual, including the LGBT community group have resulted in a separate shift for Poland as a country that still adheres to the religious values it adheres to. This is caused by the presence of conservative groups in society who refer to the ideology of populism as a rationale that is starting to strengthen in the country. Populism, which is represented through the presence of the political elite of the PiS party as the holder of parliamentary power, makes the response of the government of this country tend to be intolerant and antipathy towards upholding the rights of LGBT people. Therefore, in recent years, the act of upholding rights and the rejection of discrimination against LGBT people has become one of the social issues that are increasingly facing challenges and testing Poland's level of inclusivity in the future.

Keywords: Conservatism, Human Rights, LGBT, Poland, Populism.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In general, Eastern Europe has become one of the parts of the European Continent that consist of ten state members, such as Belarus, Democratic Republic of Czech, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Half of Russia, Moldova, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Most people of these countries are Christian Orthodox and Catholics, with the total of 57 percent in 2017 spread throughout the region (Mitchell, 2017). The existence of the majority of these religions which are popular among the people of Eastern Europe then causes religious norms to become main values which legitimize political identity, so that the conceptualization of secularism becomes something that is not taken for granted. Religion then becomes an important source of political power that can affect public mobilization. The political elites in Eastern Europe countries then consider themselves to be the agents of God's command and must have a respect for the moral assumptions and commandments of the Church. Based on the history, the collapse of communism in 1989 makes churches in Eastern European countries have experienced a significant revival. The church's stance then began to influence policy making in its government, with the major idea being to reject managerial separation in the cultural, media, education, and government sectors, so that they could be controlled based on established authorities' holistic vision (Buhuceanu, 2014).

This principle then underpins the intervention of church values in matters of state regulations, and has what is called as "political engagement". Furthermore, the Christian and Catholic ethos employed by Eastern European policymakers differs from that implemented by Western European governments. Values rooted in Christianity are viewed in Eastern European countries as the result of a construction capable of forming "European values," based on the long history of European civilization itself, which is rich in church morality. Furthermore, such an orientation maintained the Orthodox Faith's classical callousness toward state officials, which was criticized heavily by theologians such like Pantelis Kalaitzidis, who stated that "rather than getting involved in a struggle for internal spiritual revival and social reform, the Orthodox Church squanders its components and commitment on attempting to enforce its presence and behavior in the public spotlight, not even within the sense of an inclusive society, but of yearning" (Buhuceanu, 2014). As long as this paradox lingers, the church's theological voice might indeed continue to exist only in narrative form, almost as a false notion, while its 'political participation' will inevitably be limited to middle ages or before intervention models, instead of witness, togetherness, and equality.

This view is also seen as the basis for the formation of right-wing religious groups who view an increasingly liberalized society as a threat to the implementation of church values. The reactions given also include efforts to bring back de-secularization and religious rights in the public sphere, so that they feel discriminatory actions against LGBT people are something that is in accordance with God's commands, as this is in accordance with the teachings contained in the Bible. This then becomes part of the political identity that people in Eastern European countries are trying to shape, by claiming to restore classical Christian morality and ethos that are different from what is currently happening in Western European countries. Because of that, people in Eastern Europe tended to show negative and intolerant attitudes towards LGBT groups, repression and cultural resistance movements emerged that suppressed the presence of these communities, as well as escalation in the creation of legal products that limited the rights of the LGBT community (Council for European Studies, 2017). This situation created a stereotype of "Other" Europe (Eastern), that also acquired a noticeably anti - LGBT reputation in the 2000s (Chetaille, 2013). As a result, old stereotypes like "Romanians, Greeks, Serbians, Moldovans, and Russians are Orthodox," or "Poles and Croats are Catholic," have been rebuilt to deny the organic union of Church, Nation, and State. They were frequently used by the Church as a solid and popular framework for its identity politics, as well as a method of rebellion against "global order" organizations such as the UN and the EU, which promote diversity among social communities, particularly by promoting human rights against the LGBT community.

The significance of differences in public treatment of acceptance of LGBT groups in Western European and Eastern European countries can be proven through a survey conducted by the European Values Study from 1990 to 2010. Western European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, UK and Spain reduced their intolerance levels from an average of 30% to 13%. (Council for European Studies, 2017). On the other hand, countries in Eastern Europe such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania tend to show stagnant percentages compared to Western European countries.


Fig. 1. Illustrate changes in the percentage of European respondents who do not want a homosexual person as their neighbor.
Source: European Values Study

Based on the data presented above, acceptance of LGBT people is less likely in Eastern European than in Western European countries. This can be supported by a study conducted by the World Value Survey from 2010 to 2014. The overall goal of this survey is to conduct research on community respondents regarding their willingness to coexist in the same neighborhood with the LGBT people and other groups.

According to the data, people in Eastern Europe have a perception or opinion that LGBT people, like other groups in society such as drug addicts, alcoholics, and people with AIDS, are threatening and fail to adhere strictly to existing moral values. This is coherent with other research arguing that homonegativity differs from – and is significantly higher than – other forms of intolerance or sexual orientation in Eastern Europe. If not outright rejecting democracy, many Eastern Europeans have quite a solid pessimism about what democracy works and how it may be connected to influences risking based on culture, governmental, and general prosperity - and how LGBT activities fit into this storyline. Experts then see that the factors causing the formation of homonegativity attitudes can be caused by the economic background, level of education, and adherence to religious values that are held.

Furthermore, awareness and understanding of democratic values can be a determining factor in open-mindedness to the presence of LGBT groups and organizations. People with a higher level of education, higher income level, not overly religious, and younger will be more tolerant than people in the opposite situation.

Fig. 2. Illustrate the average rejection of various groups as neighbors among Eastern European sample.
Source: World Value Survey.

Furthermore, citizens that are less rightist and often active in community engagement are much more likely to agree with the local government's acceptance of basic human protections for LGBT people. In accordance with the ILGA-Europe (European arm of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association) yearly review, the photographs for sexual identity minorities persists "complicated," particularly because Europe's goodwill as a transmitter of inclusivity is still a "interfacial image that doesn't tell an exhaustive or accurate picture" (Fitzsimons, 2020). According to the findings, a more accurate story would focus on the "rollback" predicted in the previous ILGA-Europe report, where it "gained traction in a huge increase of offensive speech" in 2019 that was "often conducted by government servants" (Fitzsimons, 2020).

On the other side, there is a belief in the socialist government era that, aside from politically driven legitimate persecution, there's no LGBT background to discuss. This one is consistent with the interpretation that modern Eastern European communities seem to be more homophobic than Western countries – which is unjustified considering the popularity of neo-populist anti-LGBT persuasion in Hungary, Russia, Poland, and elsewhere. However, Soviet regimes suppressed the establishment of not just LGBT movements, but also other movements, which meant that society emancipation did not ever accompany this linear path. The regime's leadership was behind the decriminalization of homosexuality. Even after the legal threat had been eliminated, sexual minorities stayed hidden on both an individual and collective level. Because of this structural silencing, there weren't any West cultural influences to generate a constant collective memory of such movement patterns while homophobia remained prevalent in society.

Poland is one of the Eastern European nations that has a low acceptance rate of LGBT persons. Following the demise of the USSR, there was a government transformation into a democratic system as a self-evident form of this country's place and role in the European Union. Poland is a country that is close to the "return to Europe" metaphor in reflecting post-socialist conditions, so that this country is considered as one that holds Euro-enthusiastic values. Becoming a member of the European Union is considered to be an achievement that Poland can make, considering that this country has ambitions to become an open nation with modernization, and is no longer under the shadow of the Soviet Union's authoritarian government. However, after officially joining the European Union in 2003, this resulted in Poland having to face challenges in the form of cultural and value friction which became the basis for the formation of regulations within the regional organization. The existence of cultural friction in European Union regulations which is dominated by the values of Western European countries has resulted in Poland experiencing what is known as "cultural anxiety" as a challenge in maintaining its collective national identity.

One of the regulations in the European Union is related to the acceptance of LGBT groups and the enforcement of their human rights. However, the presence of conservative groups that are still strong in Poland has led to strong resistance towards feminist and LGBT community groups who are close to the values of European Union liberalism. This then makes conservative groups in Poland experience difficulties in accepting this value as a "European identity" in the public space (Chojnicka, 2015). In recent years, Poland has experienced an increase in real threats that tend to threaten the equality of human rights for LGBT people in society. These threats varied, ranging from campaigns against equal rights, which were often part of political interests, to the spread of hate issues which became a challenge in the implementation of peace. Regulations prohibiting the enforcement of human rights against LGBT groups, especially during the reign of Jaroslav Kaczynski, who formed a legislative regulation to censor everything related to LGBT

in academic substance in 2007 (ILGA Europe, 2007). In the previous year, the local government also launched a draft law which was used to ban homosexual propaganda and other rhetoric related to the anti-gay context in 2004. In that year, regulations expressly prohibiting the enforcement of the rights of sexual minorities were also issued by the Warsaw government and in Poznan, so that in 2005 the European Human Rights Court responded that the regulation is categorized as discriminatory in nature.

The emergence of criticism and prohibitions related to the existence of LGBT groups in Poland cannot be separated from the involvement of nationalist groups or, more accurately, homophobic nationalism, which is expanding in Central and Eastern European states as a pattern of imposition of what Western European governments support. In 2007, 86% of the total Polish community respondents did not allow or approve of their children having contact or interacting with gay or lesbian people (Chojnicka, 2015). A later survey also stated that only around 4% of the total respondents only considered LGBT as something normal. The existence of this phenomenon has led Poland to the term "Poles are an anti - LGBT nation, and they are proud of it", so that this term is also an issue and a challenge for the LGBT community in Poland. In 2006, a survey conducted by the European Commission noted that the level of acceptance of homosexual marriage and the adoption of children by homosexual couples only reached 17%, whereas the average of other countries that are members of the European Union has reached 44% (Chojnicka, 2015).

Until now, the anti-LGBT situation is still one of the challenges for upholding human rights in Poland. The presence of the right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS), that strongly opposes any form of enforcement agenda and campaigns for LGBT rights, is also seen as driving this phenomenon. The ideology adopted by this party is based on "traditional Polish values", which tend to be skeptical of minorities, which also includes the presence of refugees and other Muslim migraines who are considered to be a threat to Polish and Christian values (Ciobanu, 2019). In 2015, PiS became the party that occupied the majority of seats in parliament, so the development of the increasingly widespread ideology of nationalism and populism could influence the direction of the state's policies. A sovereign country which is gaining steam toward national identity and populist politics continues to threaten encroaching on the rights of people or whoever the nation perceives as "other". They are trying to establish those who don't relate to the nationhood by having a national identity, particularly around religions, and as a result, the individuals may be isolated and shunned by society.

After PiS victory as a candidate who passed the parliamentary elections in 2019 and the presidential election in 2020, this party often uses anti-LGBT rhetoric as a form of real threat to public morality. ILGA Europe also said that by 2020, "the anti-LGBT rhetoric set up by PiS was able to achieve the support of up to 80% of the local government, which is also trying to bring Poland into a country that is 'free from LGBT ideology'. One of the candidates from this party, Andrzej Duda, stated that the promotion of upholding LGBT rights is a more destructive ideology compared to communism (Yingst, 2020). Furthermore, members of the PiS and Catholic clergy claimed that LGBT principles were diametrically opposed to conservative values and repeatedly tried to associate the minority groups to pedophilia. In 2020, the national authorities announced the "Family Charter" regulation as a type of safeguards for the same marriage and child adoption services by same-sex marriages (Fitzsimons, 2020). In fact, before the European Union election results last May, In July 2019, several Polish localities proclaimed themself "LGBT free," as well as a news outlet affiliated with Poland election campaigns labeled "Gay Right Free Zone," are tags. Therefore, based on the description of the background of the selected cases, this paper attempts to discuss the relevance of the rising value of populism within right-wing parties as a challenge in upholding the human rights of the LGBT community in Poland.

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The general study of populist rhetoric seeks to create interconnectivity between political, social and economic aspects in view of the phenomena that are currently occurring. The terminology regarding populism is also closely related to identifying social issues in international relations. This is driven by the development of populism which has now become the basis for the emergence of right-wing, authoritarian and anti-establishment parties, to the religious nationalist movement. In terms, populism is rooted in the Latin term "populous," which means "the masses" or "the people" (Koszykowska, 2018). Populism works by creating narratives that can form polarization within society, to become us and them, strengthening sovereignty, which is also close to the presence of nationalists and moderates (Anditya, 2017). Populism also develops as the antithesis of the existence of liberal democracy in democratic countries which tend to be underdeveloped, resulting in the existing society being less able to participate in the decision-making process. This division is then exploited by right-wing groups in creating claims against themselves as a representation of the aspirations of the existing society. In several phenomena of populism, these groups often identify themselves with certain religious and racial values as the fundamental basis they hold.

Fundamentalism of religious values that are carried later is used as a political tool which is the way for certain groups or parties to fulfill the interests that are achieved.

Historically, the use of the term populism first began to develop in the late 19th century in the United States. Populism emerges as a concept used to analyze the points of view of the entrenched power parties, as a concept which represents different types of political discourse, and as a concept used to identify political involvement. With the passage of time, the idea of populism has come to be used as a set of beliefs around an epistemological and political ideology as a component of a strategy. According to social science and modern populism experts, Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, populism as an ideology is capable of being a composition of the noble values of homogeneous people or elites who tend to be a weakness for upholding individual sovereignty in obtaining rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voices in public spaces (Koszykowska, 2018). Populism is now also understood as a political program used to achieve victory for a party, as opposed to traditional political parties, or as a type of political attack from the elite who are stakeholders. The concept of populism is seen as opportunism and consistency in the implementation of political values used in capturing general election preferences. As a result, populism is now viewed as a collection of movement patterns that have taken shape in many prevailing liberal democracies, primarily upon that right side of the spectrum and pose a threat to major political parties and regular policies (Koszykowska, 2018).

Therefore, currently the value of populism is often implemented through nationalist groups who believe that being a member or part of a nation is a valuable thing and is the main source of a sense of national pride and satisfaction. These traits are also linked to high personality, pro-sociality, and ingroup acceptance (Mole *et al.*, 2021). In other words, populism is a foundation that can bring achievement as part of a nation that is filled with a sense of pride for individuals who have become an original part of the region. Therefore, this understanding results in the emergence of a sense of exclusivity in treating minority communities who live side by side with them. In addition, populist is also considered as the basis for forming policies and the direction of government movement in suppressing the rights of minorities. Populism values are also now internalized in the policy-making process, in order to increase majoritarian preferences in the interests to be achieved. Majoritarian preferences tend to try to increase the possibility of undermining the rights of minority groups, especially if these minority groups are not in accordance with the values and norms believed by society. According to Schattschneider (1960), the output of pluralist conflict as a consequence of populism application is ascertained by the context of the conflict (Pappas *et al.*, 2009). If ruling classes are supportive, undesirable groups can benefit by the most preferable policy simply by limiting the nature of the disagreement. Haider Markel and Meier (1996) studied that whether spotlight of the disagreement altered the magnitude upon which activist mobilization and elite comorbidities, or ethics and morals variables, were affected in their seminal study (Pappas *et al.*, 2009).

The populist interests of the elite are the backdrop for the occurrence of right-wing parties across Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. During the period of the cultural revolution, personal values often played a part in determining national political preferences. The emergence of individuals who are part of the LGBT community is a form of social phenomenon that is considered by populists as a challenge to traditional value hierarchies and gender norms. When member states declined to alter their restrictions, they constructed cross border ties and partnered with multilateral institutions to enact new policies from a high level, including the correction of the EU's Fairness in Employment Directive, which made sexual preference discrimination against employees in Germany or other EU member countries illegal for the first time. Within just a few decades, an enormous number of legislative changes were approved in a short period of time. Furthermore, RWP factions are frequently depicted as being the core component of a counter cultural progression. They prefer traditional system design, male supremacy edifices, and conservative standpoints on sexual interactions. They genuinely think that identifying based on sexual orientation promotes individual freedom while undermining social solidarity. Rather than an infringement of religious doctrine, right-wing populists see homosexual activity as just an abnormal, destructive force in the family and society (Siegel, 2017). LGBT activist groups act as uncontrollable interest groups, colluding with international organizations such as the EU to create legislation and punishment authorities that diminish sovereign rights by misrepresenting a country's instinctive and long-held cultural norms (Siegel, 2017).

Extremists on the right may still actively sought to condone homosexuals in sequence to obliterate or nullify them from society. A member of Hungary's Jobbik Party proposed an "Anti-Gay Propaganda Law" In 2012 which prohibited commercial and social events that "reinforced related to sex perversion," implying homosexuality (Siegel, 2017). Nonetheless, the LGBT community is now facing a potential threat from others within certain right conservative populist movements in West Europe. As homosexuality and gay and lesbian equality become more widely accepted, right parties in West Europe attempt to refrain from appearing abhorrent or out of step with society. As more laws granting equal treatment to the LGBT community are passed, their ideology shifts faster. What distinguishes right side populist parties from their own conservative political opponents is the prominence of anti-gay policies and statements (Siegel, 2017).

They downplay their previous or current opposition to fair opportunities and instead endeavor to frame LGBT people as extremely sensitive to the identical forces that jeopardize the rest of the nation.

Their philosophy shifts faster as more regulations granting equal treatment to the LGBT people are passed. Right-wing populist movements are distinguished from their own conservative political opponents by the notoriety of anti-gay policies and statements. Mainstream conservative parties oppose gay rights but try to downplay the issue considering their pro-EU stances to avoid appearing anti-European. As a result, much further populist parties portray a portion of society that seem to be firmly opposed to LGBT rights. As a result, right-wing parties take major positions, which they frequently use in their campaign discourse. They contend that homosexuality violates laws of nature and is morally distorting. Post-communist countries have a more partisan divide on LGBT rights than Western Europe does today. Leftist alliances, for example, proposed and endorsed same-sex civil unions in Poland as well as the Czech Republic.

Mainstream conservatives criticize LGBT rights while attempting to downplay the issue due to their pro-EU stances in order to keep from appearing anti-European. As a consequence, much further populist movements reflect a portion of society that seem to be staunchly anti-LGBT people. As a result, right-wing parties demand extreme positions, which they frequently employ within their own political speeches. They argue that homosexuality is against natural law and morally corrupting. Seeing right side populist parties in Europe as a natural response to left-libertarian socio - cultural maneuvers in the 1960s and 1970s ignores how RWP undertook LGBT basic civil liberties differently. We must not underestimate the potential of right populist parties to shift their positions through reaction to shifting electorates and legislation. Right populist parties can quickly adjust new positions without experiencing much critiques for hypocrisy because they are actual problems rather than gestures of depth economic and social fragmentation. Indeed, the LGBT people could be redefined as a "friend" instead of a "foe" (Siegel, 2017).

LGBT activists and followers will need to develop response strategies that account for the new divisions that right movements are actively trying to cultivate in Western Europe, as well as the true potential harms that right extremists portray them in post-communist nations. If the scientific proof inside the French case is accurate, we can presume that LGBT people become divided in more countries over concerns about immigration and religious minorities' equality. It is always a mistake to perceive LGBT residents as unified and homogeneous. However, the majoring conservative rhetoric in rightist Poland is best illustrated by the concept of a "sense of national narcissism", that has been proffered as self-centered lifted to the group level. It is outlined as just the "belief that the ingroup is exceptional and obtained protection of individuals but isn't appropriately recognized by others". This demarcation, we believe, will aid social psychologists of nationalistic in gaining a much more complex awareness of the various content material of national ideology and their intercultural behaviors toward minorities.

For example, Jaroslaw Kaczenski of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) insisted on prohibiting gay and lesbian teachers from teaching in schools. Representatives of the League of Polish Families Party portrayed gays as pedophiles. They, like other RWP parties, appear to be highly skeptical of international institutions. Those that have conceived the EU as well as the intercontinental court system as trying to erode sovereign control by embracing digital concepts such as gay or lesbian equality. International political bodies' efforts to expand gay freedoms are viewed as a "European" as well as "West" exegesis and planning process that contradicts nationwide beliefs. Sexual preference is forbidden in all areas of government policy, not even just private employment, because the court decision contradicts national norms. Poland and Hungary had also signed an agreement that could advance individual liberties and rights all through the EU, along with such togetherness of the same civil marriages among all member states. They also rejected a so-called "Horizontal Directive," which would have prohibited sexual orientation discrimination in all areas of policy, not just private enterprise, on the grounds that it violated national norms.

III. Method

A. Types of Research

This study is qualitative in nature, which according to Creswell is described as effective models that enable researchers to understand and structure developments in details of real and actual phenomena that are owned (Marvasti, 2018). In addition, qualitative research is also used with the aim of providing an overview, explaining, and giving interpretation of the data or information that has been collected (Marvasti, 2018). Types of qualitative research used in this study is descriptive qualitative, which aims to provide a coherent narrative arrangement regarding the main theme of the research. As for the result This descriptive qualitative research is expected to help construct deep understanding of social problems that occur through interpretation researchers (Fadli, 2021). Not only that, the purpose of using this type of qualitative descriptive research is to make a systematic and accurate presentation of the scope of this research. In addition, the methods used in this type of research by collecting data from previous research based on the alignment of the phenomena researched.

B. Types of Data

This study uses secondary data, namely data obtained through internal sources in the form of scientific articles, journals, official government websites, and data published by institutions which can be in the form of words, numbers, and pictures. Secondary data is used to help obtain information in solving problems related to the research topic.

C. Data Collection Techniques

A review of literature based on previous research was used to collect data for this study. According to Creswell, this stage is seen as a search process for materials that have relevance to the phenomenon to be studied, in order to avoid. There is duplication of previous research (Fadli, 2021). A structured characterization and examination of papers related to the topic research was used to conduct a literature review (Shi, 2006). Documents used in the literature review include articles, dissertations, and other research reports. In addition, in giving his presentation to explain the existing issues the researcher collects, studies, compiles, then transforms the collection of information and data obtained into narrative form systematically.

D. Data Analysis Techniques

According to the type of qualitative research undertaken, the method of data analysis used in this study was modified. The method of data analysis was executed at the following stages:

1) Data reduction

The stages of data reduction can be defined as the stages in which the researcher makes a selection of the information obtained, focusing the data obtained for a research problem. Through this stage, researchers sort the data by selecting data that is interesting, important, useful and new (Fadli, 2021). The stages of data reduction will also help researchers in getting a clearer picture of the problem under study and make it easier to obtain other information.

2) Data presentation

The stages of presenting data or data display are the steps taken by researchers in data analysis techniques after going through data reduction. In this stage, data that has been collected is rearranged into the form of descriptions or descriptions in order later can help researchers better understand the phenomenon under study (Fadli, 2021).

3) Conclusion drawing

Drawing conclusions or also known as the verification stage, is a process where data and information that has been collected is used by researchers as material in answering the problem under study. Conclusion this can be done through a study of causation, relevance and causality. There is a relationship between data and problems in research. In addition, a qualitative research conclusion is expected to build or bring up the update which has not been found in previous studies.

IV. ANALYSIS

In broad sense, the occurrence of discriminatory practices and the lack of recognition of LGBT community organizations in Poland is related to the country's rising impact of right groups and populist elites. Failing to uphold issues of human rights for LGBT community organizations in Poland is now viewed as a real threat to the nation's identity by the country's populous conservative groups. The existence of this assumption is based on the strengthening of Catholic religious teachings, which are interpreted that LGBT community groups are a challenge to the social values that are believed. The relationship between nationalism held by right-wing populism groups and homophobia has become increasingly significant over the past few years, because the issue is now part of the regulations governed by right-wing parties that dominate parliament. PiS as a right-wing party binds its ideology based on the values of Catholic nationalism, or what is now known as the 'Pole Catholic' (Żuk & Żuk, 2019).

Thus, according to them, Catholic learning is a natural part of national heritage that must be incorporated into the cultural and social policy framework before it can be implemented. According to Jaroslaw Kacynski, the PiS party's founder, "Anyone who studies Polish historical context recognizes that there is absolutely no historical record of a sovereign Polish nation alone without Catholic beliefs; and someone who raises a hand against Catholic trust, did raise a hand against Poland" (Żuk & Żuk, 2019). Therefore, the presence of PiS as the dominant right-wing party occupying the government in Poland has resulted in the country's national identity being constructed by conservative elite forces, which use Catholic religious teachings as ideological instruments in influencing aspects of policy in the public sphere.

In early modern Poland, the transition toward the populist politics and subsequent rethinking of the country have tended to result in Polish national identity, harvesting a sense of national narcissism as prominent narratives about Polish nationhood. Psychological research said that collaborative narcissistic

people request privilege for the country rather than equality and contrive enemies both within and without the national ingroup to blame for impeding the achievement of this privilege. National collective narcissists see minorities like a hazard to the nation's identity rather than as equal members of the nation. Right side populist parties impacted by a sense of national narcissism hold this view nationwide. The dissection of existing literature outlined four foremost homosexuals remain weak thought to pose to the nation: (i) those who do not contribute to the country's sexual biology; (ii) those who do not participate in indigenous social reproduction; (iii) those who do not make adjustments to broad generalizations of womanhood and manhood; and (iv) some who veer away from widely accepted minimum requirements, notably those derived through religious commands (Mole *et al.*, 2021).

The rise in popularity of conservative right-wing parties since 2015 has made Poland a country with a progressively weaker level of implementation of democratic values and enforcement of individual rights. The strengthening of the popularity and preference of voters for the right-wing populist party in Poland can be proven through data interpreted based on a survey by the Pew Research Center by looking at the trend of increase in voters from 2000 to 2022 in some Eastern European Countries.


Fig. 3. Illustrate the increase in populist parties vote in many recent Europe elections (2020-2022).
Source: Pew Research Center.

Based on the data above, Right wing populist parties had already risen to power in Poland, making significant gains over the last two decades. Between 2001 and 2019, the dominant political Law and Justice Party (PiS) increased nearly its vote share, rising from one-tenth to four-tenths (Silver, 2022). Moreover, currently there is no gender recognition legislation in Poland. Existing legislation requires people who want to undergo gender correction to file a lawsuit against their parents. Furthermore, individuals seeking a gender recognition decision are still not allowed to receive treatment to resolve internal or external sexual characteristics prior to receiving a gender recognition decision from a court. They must take long for the operation to be completed while continuing to emerge under their old names. Unlike transgender people in other countries, because they are not required by law to undergo genital body part surgery to modify their legal status, they can continue to reproduce.

Attacks on the LGBT community had already increased since its conservative Law and Justice (PiS) group seized control in 2015, in addition to the amount of anti - LGBT violence (Mizielinska, 2020). The tone of the Catholic faith is remarkably critical in influencing national discussions on this issue, and current legislators take it very seriously (Mizielinska, 2020). Both religion and also the authorities, guided by PiS party, have recently partnered in alienating LGBT communities in Poland, attempting to portray this "LGBT philosophy" as a foe of Polish society. This can then be proven through data based on research conducted by FRA Europe in 2020, regarding the percentage of respondents in various countries who tend to be afraid and avoid being in public places because they are worried about acts of discrimination as part of LGBT people. The data shows that the results of respondents in Poland stated that as much as 51% still felt afraid to be in public places and other domestic areas because they were worried, they would get discriminatory treatment.

Fig. 4. Illustrate respondents survey who avoid certain places or location for fear of
being assaulted, threatened, or harassed due to being LGBT in 2020.
Source: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

There has been an increase in protests against the government in Poland which tends to suppress the presence of LGBT community groups and has become a new trend that is now testing the future quality of an inclusive social environment in that country. The domestic government openly states that the rights of LGBT people are part of an "anti-gender ideology" which is capable of disturbing public order. Therefore, now many LGBT community groups have decided to leave Poland because the country is considered not capable enough to provide safe protection for the survival of this community group. Until 2021, as many as 100 local areas in Poland have continued to declare their regional administrations as "LGBT Ideology Free Zones", thus indicating that the level of discrimination against LGBT people in this country is getting stronger to guarantee protection and a sustainable life.

Therefore, Poland will face increasingly heated challenges, where even the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, now considers Mateusz Morawiecki as Prime Minister of Poland who currently serves as "an extreme-right anti-Semite who bans LGBT people." Therefore, based on the analysis that has been identified, now the LGBT community in Poland must face challenges in obtaining the enforcement of their human rights, as part of their efforts to obtain proper treatment in the public space for the next few years. The existence of cases of arresting activists and participants in protest actions as a form of suppression for the domestic government is seen as a new challenge in achieving the aspired interests.

V. Conclusion

Based on the description previously presented, it can be concluded that Poland is now one of those located in the Eastern European Region which has its own challenges in the issue of upholding human rights for LGBT community groups. This is due to the strengthening of the roots of values and teachings of the Catholic religion as the majority belief held by the population of the country, which is considered part of the identity and construction of the nation's existing social values. The existence of these religious values is then used as a political instrument by conservative groups based on populist ideology who consider that anything that is contrary to religious values is a threat to the existing form of national identity. This was further strengthened by the rise in popularity of PiS as a right-wing party in Poland that dominates policy-making in the current parliament, so that the policy direction made also supports acts of oppression for LGBT community groups. Therefore, through this paper it can be seen that there is relevance between the rise in popularity of right-wing parties as representatives of populism elites in the implementation of upholding the human rights of LGBT people in Poland. Therefore, now being a group in a social environment that is discriminated against is a form of challenge and obstacle that must be faced by the LGBT community in Poland, as long as conservative parties and populist elites still play strategic roles in government seats.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Authors declare that they do not have any conflict of interest.

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